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THE RELIGIOUS AND ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOMS
OF BUSINESS OWNERS

Julie Manning Magid and Jamie Darin Prenkertt
May private employers who are not exempted from Title V11' as
religious employers but who nonetheless wish to pursue a niche market of
catering to and advocating a narrow theological orientation employ only
those with a shared religious practice or belief? Recent United States
Supreme Court decisions have strengthened free exercise' hybrid rights3
and, in particular, freedom of association,4 which necessarily contracts the
reach of antidiscrimination legislation.5 The theoretical parameters of these
decisions grant currently non-exempt religious employers, albeit perhaps
unintentionally, the constitutionally protected right to promote religion and
exert their associational freedoms through their employment decisions, in
particular the decision to hire only those individuals who share and who are
willing to promote the employer's religious beliefs and values.6
t Assistant Professors of Law, Indiana University Kelley School of Business. We are
grateful to Douglas Laycock and Eugene Volokh for their comments as we were developing
this Article. Our thanks to the participants in the Eighth Annual Huber Hurst Research
Seminar co-sponsored by the University of Florida and the Wharton School of Business for
their diligence and insights.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990)
(linking free exercise rights with other constitutional protections that, conjoined, receive
heightened scrutiny); see William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower
Courts: Free Exercise Plus or ConstitutionalSmoke Screen?, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 211
(1998) (discussing hybrid rights).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. References to antidiscrimination legislation in employment are meant to reference
Title VII and state statutes, many of which simply mirror the provisions of Title VII. This
general reference also incorporates federal civil rights statutes prohibiting discrimination on
other grounds and their state counterparts. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability, record of disability, or perceived disability); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age involving
employees over forty years of age); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (prohibiting
wage discrimination based on gender). Courts routinely interpret these statutes and their
respective enforcement schemes consistently with Title VII.
6. See infra Part III.C.
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That the employer devoted to employing co-religionists has emerged
as the chief beneficiary of Smith's7 lowering the scrutiny of government
intrusion in free exercise claims may be ironic, but it is a result following
the emergence of expressive association as a trump to antidiscrimination
legislation in Dale.8 Thus, the end of the Sherbert9 era did not necessarily
bring about a wholesale defeat for the free exercise of religion but instead
is marked by an expanding definition of religion and a resurgent
commitment to less encumbered associational freedoms, which have
created a super-hybrid protecting the employment decisions of those
business owners with a devotion that is considered religious.
This super-hybrid right has important implications for the private
employer who chooses co-religionist employees over otherwise qualified
individuals to promote a religious message.
While clearly not
overwhelming in their representation in American business, such
companies can and do enter the marketplace. In EEOC v. Preferred
Management Corp.1 ° the owners of a home health care agency were born
again Christians who adhered to "The Great Commission," a religious
directive to go into the world and share their faith." "The world" includes
their workplace.12 Can these business owners hire only co-religionists who
share their faith and who will promote their religious beliefs to their clients
while at the same time functioning as home health care providers? 3 A
second related, yet distinct, example of an employer whose behavior
implicates the constitutional issues addressed in this Article is the business
owner whose religious worship requires substantial time diverted from the
typical workday. For this reason, the business is designed to accommodate
the employment needs of co-religionists. Any positions filled by a nonadherent to this belief system results in one less employment opportunity
for a co-religionist, who must then choose between worshiping according
to the religion's beliefs and earning a livelihood. Therefore, the owner
reserves all positions for co-religionists.
These scenarios are raised by the nexus of three strains of
constitutional jurisprudence: free exercise, the Establishment Clause, and
7. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
8. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
9. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
10. 216 F. Supp. 2d 763 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
11. Id. at 772-73; see Matthew 28:19-20 (King James) ("Go ye therefore, and teach all
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.
Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you....
12. PreferredMgmt. Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 773.
13. The facts of Preferred Management do not raise this precise issue because the
owners of the home health care agency knowingly hired both adherents and non-adherents
to their belief system and then subsequently tried to convert the non-adherents. Id.
("Preferred employs an 'evangelism and discipleship' subcommittee whose members have
prayed for the salvation of employees.").
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freedom of association.
We do not advocate for an expanded
understanding of these constitutional protections. Instead, we present the
recent Supreme Court rulings that have broadly interpreted an
organization's expressive association rights.
This Court's broader
application of freedom of association has significant impact when
considered with a free exercise of religion claim. This Article urges a
consideration of the impact of the super-hybrid right on civil rights
legislation before constitutional jurisprudence forces an unexamined
conclusion.
At the very core of this issue is the question of constitutional tension
between freedom and equality. 14 In particular, religious diversity is a
constitutional strength and conundrum because tolerance for religious
beliefs does not promote necessarily tolerant religious beliefs. Dale
portends an important shift in the constitutional balance toward promoting
associational freedom over equality.
This Article argues that deference toward both religious and
associational freedoms need not eclipse equality protections. In light of the
free exercise hybrid right created - even if inadvertently - by the Court's
recent decisions, the context of Title VII antidiscrimination legislation must
be considered. 5 Expanding the category of exempt religious employers to
accommodate the employers who advocate and advance their religious
beliefs through their occupational pursuits and employment decisions6
strikes the appropriate balance between over- and under-protectiveness.
Through this recommendation, business owners whose main purpose is a
devotion that is religious will attain the right to employ co-religionists to
carry out that purpose. In contrast, a business may not base employment
decisions on religious belief if its owners are religious or have a religious
niche but do not have a goal to advance or advocate a particular religious
belief system or practice through the business. In formulating this response
to the tension between broad associational freedoms and civil rights
legislation, the Article contextualizes the current standard for religious
exemptions under Title VII as impacted by the changed emphasis in
religious and associational freedoms that now join to create a super-hybrid
right.
Necessarily, the courts must treat religion under Title VII differently
14. See Alan Brownstein, Symposium, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False
Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POLITICS 119, 119

(2002) ("The core of our legal and political culture has been pragmatism and
experimentation, not a commitment to unchangeable absolutes and fixed principles.").
15.

See infra Part II.B.

16. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(voicing concerns the Court's test for associational freedoms is both "overprotective of
activities undeserving of constitutional shelter and underprotective of important First
Amendment concerns.").
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from other protected classes. Part I of this Article highlights the unique
nature of religious freedom as evidenced by the religious employer
exemption from Title VII. 17 Courts generally do not treat this exemption

broadly, 18 but an interpretation that is too narrow implicates the
Establishment Clause 9 and its parallel values of separation and neutrality.2 °
Concurrently, the Free Exercise Clause is emerging as a challenge to
federal and state antidiscrimination laws. Part II examines Smith as a shift
away from traditional categories of religion toward an emphasis on any
additional rights implicated with free exercise to form a hybrid right
entitled to heightened scrutiny. Part III then recognizes Dale as providing
broad associational freedoms with no consideration of the limiting
parameters previously defining expressive association.
Thus, the
combination of religious exercise and association freedom forms a superior
hybrid right with a broad emphasis on freedom over equality. Part IV
offers a method by which this right may be contained within the established
religious employer exemption to permit co-existence between wellrecognized freedoms and a waning judicial interest in civil rights
legislation.

I. THE RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXEMPTION OF TITLE VII

A. Religion Fails to Conform to Title VII Paradigm
Religion as a basis for protection from discrimination in employment
has been different from other protected categories of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196421 from its inception. Title VII represents the traditional
antidiscrimination model,22 what we refer to as the Title VII paradigm.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000).
18. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. See infra Part I.C. But see Brownstein, supra note 14, at 120-21 (positing that
formal neutrality and "the subsuming of religion under the rubric" of free speech are
replacing the doctrine of separatism).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) of Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
22. For an

excellent

discussion of the paradigms

of antidiscrimination

and
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This paradigm wholly rejects discrimination on the enumerated bases
permitting only the very narrow bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) exception. 23 The Title VH paradigm proved problematic only for
the protected category of religion. 4 As a result of the unique constitutional
protection of religion, accommodation of employees' religious practices is
included in legislation otherwise developed in an antidiscrimination
paradigm. 25 The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution require a delicate balance of permitting religious freedom,
yet avoiding government endorsement. Part of this balancing includes the
exemption for religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition of
religious discrimination.27
Defining "religion" for purposes of Title VII calls into question these
same constitutional protections. 28 The EEOC Guidelines 29 utilize the term
itself in a circular definition derived from the Welsh30 and Seeger,1
decisions. Thus, courts look to whether a belief is held as "religious"
without defining the differentiation between values or priorities from
religion.32 Many commentators and courts favor avoiding differentiation
accommodation, see Christine Jolls, Antidiscriminationand Accommodation, 115 HARV. L.
REv. 642 (2001).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000); see infra Part IV.B.
24. However, the protected category of sex later proved problematic as applied to
pregnancy. See generally Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining
the PregnancyDiscriminationAct, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 819 (2001).
25. Cf.Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. and Univs. for Northeastern Ill.
Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Title I of the ADA, by contrast, requires
employers to consider and to accommodate disabilities, and in the process extends beyond
the anti-discrimination principle.").
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...").
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000); see infra Part I.B.
28. Obviously, this particular issue does not exist in a vacuum. Modem regulation of
religious tax exemptions begs many of the same questions. Religious institutions organized
and operated exclusively for a limited number of purposes are tax exempt (often referred to
as "501(c)(3) organizations"). 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). Nonetheless, the Internal
Revenue Service considers "religion" broadly to avoid Establishment Clause violations. See
Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977) ("An attempt to define religion, even for purposes
of statutory construction, violates the 'establishment' clause since it necessarily delineates
and, therefore, limits what can and cannot be a religion.").
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2000). The EEOC Guidelines are interpretive regulations.
Although they do not have the force of law, courts often rely upon them. The Supreme
Court states, "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [the
Guidelines] do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) supersededby
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k).
30. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
31. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2000) ("[T]he Commission will define religious practices to
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between religious and nonreligious belief systems by focusing on the
broader interpretation of feelings of the conscience established by the
Selective Service for conscientious objector purposes.33
Thus, feelings motivated by inner conscience, even if they comply
with no known religious organization, may warrant protection under Title
VII. 34 Despite the courts' use of morality and ethics for definitional
purposes, there is resistance to rely on the normative force of social entities
to define religion. A broad notion of commitment to justice that underlies
other antidiscrimination legislation cannot be employed in the religious
context because religion is constitutionally protected from being
normalized by the majority.35 A belief in white supremacy and intolerance
toward minorities if sincerely held as religious is protected under the
not make promotion decisions based
Constitution even if a supervisor may
36
upon these beliefs under Title VII.
Religious beliefs, then, are those defined by the individual claiming
the religious belief.3 7 Although affiliation with or membership in an
organization of a religious nature is not necessary for the individual to hold
a belief as religious, if such an organization is referenced by the individual,
the belief need not be one mandated by that organization.38 An
individualized understanding of the doctrines of an established religious
organization is adequate to support the belief as religious.39
include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with
the strength of traditional religious views."); cf. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977)
("[T]he primary rule as to religiousity is whether the organization's adherents are sincere in
their beliefs.").
33. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339-40 ("What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's
conscientious objection to all war to be 'religious' within the meaning of § 6(j) is that this
opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is
right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions."); see Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory
of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 384 (1996); William P. Marshall,
What is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and
Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence,75 IND. L.J. 193, 203 (2000); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1007, 1008-09
(2001). But see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 688-90 (1992).
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2000).
35. Sujit Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 9 GEt. MASON L. REv. 145, 172 (2000).
36. Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1019 (E.D. Wis.
2002).
37. 29 CFR § 1605.1 (2000).
38. Geller v. Sec'y of Def., 423 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1976) (noting that religious
practice not required by religious organization may still constitute a religious belief).
39. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1988)
(noting that personal beliefs not mandated by a religious organization can constitute a
religious belief).
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B. The Parametersof the Religious Employer Exemption
Not only is religion unique in the Title VII framework from the
standpoint of what characteristics or behaviors warrant protection, but also
because Congress recognized the potential for constitutional concerns
involved in forcing certain employers to ignore religion as a basis for
making employment decisions.4 n Congress was concerned with the right of
a religious organization to identify in employees the characteristics
necessary to carry out the organization's mission. They were spurred, not
in small part, by concerns about how Title VII's demands on employer
conduct squared with the religion clauses of the First Amendment.'
In
particular, recognizing the potential Free Exercise Clause implications of
regulating religious employers, Congress exempted such employers from
the prohibition against religious discrimination.4 2 The original version of
Title VII provided exemption only in cases where the employee of a
religious employer was involved in the religious activities of the
organization. 43 A 1972 amendment to Title VII expanded the exemption,
however, to exempt all activities of the religious employer - both religious
and secular.44
Aside from the bare language of the religious employer exemption,
Title VII does not specifically define or explicate what types of employers
qualify as religious corporations, associations, educational institutions, or
societies. While courts have recognized that the religious employer
exemption is not limited on its face to houses of worship or churches,
religious orders or denominations, and other institutions that are
traditionally recognized as "religious," courts nevertheless have required an
employer that qualifies for the exemption to have some sort of relationship
or connection with that type of institution or organization.45 Still, once that

40. A related issue is the parameters of religious harassment under Title VII. See Terry
Morehead Dworkin & Ellen R. Peirce, Is Religious Harassment "More Equal?", 26 SETON
HALL L. REv. 44, 58 (1995) (discussing the "reasonable person" standard in religious
harassment cases).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000). ("[Title VII] shall not apply.., to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities").
Throughout this Article, this section of Title VII is referred to as "the religious employer
exemption."
43. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 92-899, at 16 (1972).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624-25 (6th Cir.
2000); EEOC v. Kamehameha/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 461 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
"no case holding the exemption [in Section 702(a)] to be applicable where the institution
was not wholly or partially owned by a church"); Wirth v. Coll. of the Ozarks, 26 F. Supp.
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relationship or affiliation has been shown, courts have found that a number
of employers engaging in activities as diverse as social services, health
care, publishing, and general education qualify for the exemption.46
Even when an employer qualifies for the religious employer
exemption, it is not entirely excused from complying with Title VII.
Instead, the exemption allows qualified employers to make decisions based
on religion, by limiting consideration of and continued employment to
individuals and employees "of a particular religion." 47 Nothing in the
exemption excuses an employer from the Title VII prohibitions on race,
sex, or national origin discrimination. Only discrimination on the basis of
religion is exempted.48 Nonetheless, an employee's failure to fulfill and to
support the religious behavioral and moral mandates of the particular
religion could constitute valid grounds for discharge.
The circuits are
split regarding how broadly to apply that ideal when those mandates
require or result in other forms of discrimination.5 °

2d 1185, 1187 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
46. See, e.g., Hall, 215 F.3d at 620 (discussing college of health sciences and related
healthcare entities); Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 197 (11 th Cir. 1997) (churchrelated liberal arts college); Anderson v. Loma Linda Cmty. Hosp., No. 91-56331, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 15249, at *1-*4 (9th Cir. June 16, 1993) (hospital affiliated with the
Seventh-Day Adventist church); EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Assoc., 676 F.2d 1272, 1274
(9th Cir. 1982) (non-profit publishing house); EEOC v. Mississippi Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 478
(5th Cir. 1980) (four-year liberal arts college owned and operated by Mississippi Baptist
Convention); EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154, 1155 (W.D. Wash.
1992) (retirement home operated by arm of Presbyterian denomination); Feldstein v.
Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 975 (D. Mass. 1983) (newspaper).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a).
48. See Mississippi Coil., 626 F.2d at 484; Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C.
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (E.D.N.C. 1999)
("Although [the religious employer exemption] permits religious institutions to discriminate
based on religion or religious preferences, Title VII does not permit religious organizations
to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or national origin."); Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch.,
995 F. Supp. 340, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to
the Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate,21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 275, 290-91 (1994) (citing Psalms 89:18). But see Treaver Hodson,
Comment, The Religious Employer Exemption Under Title VII: Should a Church Define Its
Own Activities? 1994 B.Y.U. L. REv. 571, 576 (arguing that courts should defer to religious
organizations to define their own religious beliefs and to create communities consistent with
those beliefs, even if the beliefs result in a disparate impact on members of other protected
classes such as race, national origin, or sex).
49. See Robert J. Araujo, "The Harvest is Plentiful But the Workers are Few": Hiring
Practices and Religiously Affiliated Universities, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 713, 732 (1996)
(citing Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) and EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries,
788 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1992)).
50. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, 805 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (describing this developing split in the circuits); see also Hodson, supra note 48
(advocating that beliefs which result in disparate impacts on other protected classes are and
should be covered by the religious employer exemption).
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Finally, the religious employer exemption reads only "this subchapter
shall not apply.., with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion.""1 The section mentions nothing about compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges. Because the section does not track the
language of Title VII's antidiscrimination mandate5 2 it is reasonable to
assume that not all employment decisions are exempted under the religious
employer exemption. The most restrictive approach is to suggest that only
the decision to hire or not to hire an individual would be included in the
exemptions.53 While courts may treat hiring and discharge decisions
differently,54 courts have applied the exemptions to decisions to discharge
an employee as well as the decision to hire.55 The EEOC admits that the
religious employer exemption's use of "employment" encompasses both
hiring and firing. 56 On the other hand, there is significant disagreement
regarding the application of the religious employer exemption to terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, like compensation, benefits, and
insurance. "
With courts finding that many less traditionally "religious" pursuits
qualify for the religious employer exemption, there are many employees of
those entities who will not be engaged in strictly religious activities. That
certainly has spawned serious debate regarding the constitutionality of the
1972 amendment to the religious employer exemption, which broadened
the exemption to include all activities of the religious employer.5 8 Far from
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting an employer "to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
53. See Brant, supra note 48, at 285, for an article espousing this restrictive "hiringonly" approach.
54. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, God and the State: Freedom of Religious Universities to
Hire and Fire, 36 EDUC. L. REP. 1093, 1106 (explaining that courts will probe discharge
decisions more thoroughly than decisions not to hire).
55. See, e.g., Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir.
2000) (citing Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1997); Little v. Wuerl,
929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991)).
56. Religious Organization Exemption, EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) 2183, at
2364.
57. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Religious Organization Exemption, EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH)
2183, at 2364
(espousing the position that the religious employer exemption does not encompass decisions
regarding terms, conditions, and privileges of employment).
While this controversy remains unresolved, its resolution is immaterial to this
Article. This Article deals with the associational expression involved with religious
employers making decisions about whom to hire and retain. Therefore, the hybrid right
created in such situations would not be present in discriminatory decisions regarding terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment. See infra Part III.
58. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
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protecting freedom of religion, critics contended, it improperly benefited
religious employers, burdening nonreligious employers in comparison.59
Settling some of this controversy, the Supreme Court determined in
1987 that the religious employer, exemption was a permissible
accommodation of religion and religious employers. A unanimous court
declared in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos 60 that the religious employer
exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause.6' Working through
the three-part Lemon v. Kurtzman62 Establishment Clause test, the majority
found that the Deseret Gymnasium, a nonprofit and nonreligious arm of the
Mormon Church, could fire a janitor for failure to maintain a certificate of
good standing with the church.63 Several justices concurred with the
judgment of the majority but qualified that agreement. 64 Nevertheless, the
several concurring opinions share with the majority opinion the common
understanding that the religious employer exemption is for the most part
safe from constitutional challenge and abrogation.65
C. GovernmentApproach to Religion: Separate or Neutral?
The role of the Establishment Clause in the issues of exemption is an
important judicial strain to intersect with the free exercise and freedom of
association jurisprudence.66 Under this clause, the courts attempt a balance
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim relying on this
argument).
59. See id. at 333.
60. Id. at 327.
61. Id.
62. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
63. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330-39.
64. Notable among the qualifications found in the concurrences is the contention that
the case leaves open the question of the constitutionality of the exemption as applied to forprofit activities of religious organizations. Id. at 344, 346, and 348 (Brennan, Blackmun,
and O'Connor, JJ. concurring in the judgment). Still, the concurring opinions do not
suggest that for-profit activities could never be exempted. Instead, Justice Brennan writes
that such activities may require a case-by-case analysis to determine their role in the
organization's religious mission. Id. at 345 n.6. This approach is consistent with this
Article's recommendation and conclusion. See infra Parts IV.B.,V.
65. This is clearly true with regard to all activities except perhaps for those secular, forprofit activities of an otherwise qualified organization. For an argument that the religious
employer exemption should apply to all activities of nonprofit religious organizations and
only the religious activities of for-profit religious organizations, see Scott D. McClure, Note,
Religious Preferences in Employment Decisions: How Far May Religious Organization
Go?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 587, 606. Again, this approach is consistent with the recommendation
of this Article. See infra Part IV.B.
66. Establishment Clause and free exercise discussions are inevitably intertwined. See
Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 969 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Although [the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses] constitute distinct protections, they also embody 'correlative
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between separating religion from government and maintaining government
neutrality with respect to religion as encapsulated by Justice Hugo Black in
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township.67 In Lemon, the Court
established a three-pronged test to determine whether a government action
maintains the required separation by examining the purpose, effect and
entanglements raised by the action.68 As conceived and practiced,69
separationism scrutinizes any relationship between government and
religion to avoid involvement that in secular matters may be permissible.7 °
The image of an impenetrable wall of separation, although dominating
Establishment Clause jurisprudence for decades,71 is not as easily practiced
as it is endorsed.
Thus, the neutrality approach to the Establishment
Clause was further developed.7 3
Rather than emphasizing an avoidance of religion in government
action, neutrality advocates an even-handed approach to religious and
secular institutions. 74 This change in emphasis 75 permits religious
and coextensive ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and fundamental
freedom [of religion]." (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 40
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
67. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (government may not "prefer one religion over another"
but must erect a "wall of separation" between Church and State).
68. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
69. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding prayer in
public schools impermissible despite students' selection of speaker); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977) (finding violation of separation of religion and government in government
aid to religious schools); Sch. Dist. of Abington Townshipv. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(ruling state-sponsored school prayer unconstitutional).
70. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43
B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2002) ("Separationist doctrine thus subjects relationships between
religion and government to special scrutiny, which may result in religion's being subjected
to legal and regulatory burdens not imposed on secular activities, or relieved from burdens
that are generally imposed on such activities.").
71. See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
230, 233 (1993).
72. For a discussion relating Establishment Clause jurisprudence to faith-based
initiatives endorsed by President Bush and Congress, see Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional
Case for Government Cooperation with Faith-BasedSocial Service Providers, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1 (1997); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46
EMORY L.J. 43 (1997).
73. But see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (discussing the Supreme Court's most
recent review of the parameters of Establishment Clause and free exercise in the context of
permitting a state to deny scholarship money to students pursuing a theology degree
emphasizes the separationist doctrine).
74. See Esbeck, supra note 72, at 26 (explaining that under neutrality, the
Establishment Clause aims for "the minimization of the government's influence over
personal choices concerning religious beliefs and practices.").
75. Professor Laycock argues that, despite some inconsistent Court decisions, there has
been no change and separation remains the only necessary analysis of Establishment Clause.
Laycock, supra note 72, at 47 ("In the Court's view, separation is and always has been a
means of maximizing religious liberty, of minimizing government interference with
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organizations to play a role in public welfare, whether that be7 6in receiving
or distributing such benefits, on par with secular organizations.
Professor Gedicks considers both neutrality and separation approaches
to the Establishment Clause issue of granting exemptions from federal
antidiscrimination laws in hiring to religious social service providers.7 7 In
his neutrality analysis he notes that nonreligious social service providers
are permitted to hire employees based on their adherence to the providers'
ideological view of the world.78 Permitting religious providers to hire only
those employees who share the same religious beliefs that inform the
providers' approach to welfare services is necessary in the neutrality
context so that all social service providers have the same ideological
freedom in formulating and advocating their social service agenda.79 Such
an exemption from federal antidiscrimination laws is much narrower under
Professor Gedicks's separation analysis.8 °
These analyses are useful in considering the free exercise and
expressive association claims of private employers who use their
businesses as a means of expressing and propagating their religious beliefs.
Specifically, can this neutral approach inform a means for delimiting the
constitutional claims of private employers who pursue a religious interest
while allowing those employers to, in the words of Professor Laycock,
"maximize their religious liberty and minimize government interference?"'"

religion, and thus, of implementing neutrality among faiths and between faith and
disbelief.").
76. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (finding that the government providing
materials to qualifying schools, including sectarian schools does not violate the
Establishment Clause).
77. Gedicks, supra note 70, at 1105-06.
78. Id.at 1105-1106.
For example, it violates no law for a secular provider to refuse to hire an
applicant who is categorically opposed to providing welfare services to the
poor. A secular provider who believes that the poor are exploited by capitalists
in a worldwide class conflict may discriminate in favor of Marxists, just as a
secular provider who believes that the poor are responsible for their own
situations may discriminate in favor of economic conservatives who believe that
wealth is accumulated only by hard work.
Id.
79. Id.at 1106.
80. Id. (Separation analysis would permit an exemption from antidiscrimination laws
only for those who "exercise leadership or doctrinal authority in the sponsoring church.").
Professor Gedicks maintains the separation analysis is the core of the Establishment Clause
protection. Id. at 1098.
81. Laycock, supra note 72, at 47.
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D. Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties
Eradicating discrimination in employment has enjoyed preeminence
among competing constitutional rights in the decades following Title VII
passage.82 Thus free exercise and associational freedom claims have been
subverted to the compelling government interest in civil rights. Cases such
as Bob Jones University v. United States83 provided an opportunity for
courts to emphasize that antidiscrimination legislation can survive even
strict scrutiny by the courts. 84 In that case, the Court determined that a
racially discriminatory admissions policy based on a sincerely held
religious belief did not excuse a religious institution from complying with
the federal tax code's antidiscrimination provisions.
Prior to Dale, the major expressive association decision of the Court
granted such deference to civil rights over associational freedoms. Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,85
equated sex discrimination to discrimination on the basis of race and noted
the "stigmatizing injury" resulting from both forms of private
discrimination.86 The fact that the Jaycees' right to expressive association
was denied by forcing it to comply with a state antidiscrimination law was
dismissed as inconsequential in light of the state's legitimate purpose in
combating discrimination.8 7
Indeed, decades of judicial approval, enforcement and enlargement of
Title VII have focused priority of equality over First Amendment
freedoms. 8 This tradition of equal rights reining in the extremities of
freedom no longer enjoys the robust support of the Supreme Court.89 The
82. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) ("[A]cts of invidious
discrimination... cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit.").
83. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
84. Id. at 603-04 (finding government interest in eradicating racial discrimination was
sufficiently compelling using strict scrutiny).
85. 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
86. Id. ("That stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that
accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of
their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.").
87. Id. at 626 ("Indeed, the Jaycees has failed to demonstrate that the Act imposes any
serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association.").
88. Neal Troum, Expressive Association and the Right to Exclude: Reading Between the
Lines in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 641, 670 (2002) ("The
Supreme Court has in the past used language suggesting that discrimination in general, and
exclusion in particular, are not properly understood as forms of protected expression.")
(citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1957); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992)).
89. See David E. Bernstein, Trends in First Amendment Jurisprudence:
Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 Mo. L. REv. 83, 139 (2001) ("Dale
suggests that the Roberts era is thankfully over, and that the nine Justices of the Supreme
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balance away from expansion of antidiscrimination legislation was not
abrupt. Indeed, Dale was presaged by Hurley's focus on government
interference with free speech rights in a decision that gives meager weight
to the goal of eradicating discrimination.9" In what has been described as a
"compelling picture of the civil libertarian approach" 9' Justice Souter's
majority opinion in Hurley refuses to subvert the message of the
organization to comply with government objectives. 92
It is not necessary to end the Title VII regime in order to provide
religious and associational freedoms to private businesses and
organizations.93 Nonetheless, striking a balance between the two is a
difficult task that necessarily establishes some distinctions pertaining to the
nature of religion and the extent of equality in employment. 94

II.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE NARROWED TO REQUIRE RELIGION PLUS

A. The Sherbert Era Gives Way to Smith Hybrid
That Congress may enact no law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion is enshrined in the First Amendment of the Constitution.95
Because government cannot restrict the beliefs of an individual, the
constitutional protection undoubtedly includes the right of individuals to
act upon their religious beliefs. 96 It is only when religiously-motivated
Court, though retaining a level of disagreement on the scope of the right of expressive
association, unanimously believe that antidiscrimination laws must be subject to the same
constitutional scrutiny as other important laws with broad popular support."); Richard A.
Epstein, The ConstitutionalPerils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L.
REv. 119, 142 (2000) (Dale "calls for the constitutional invalidation of much of the Civil
Rights Act, including Title VII insofar as it relates to employment.").
90. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995).
91. See Troum, supra note 88, at 667 (noting Justice Souter's opinion places "the line
of permissible government intervention at a relatively low threshold").
92. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.
93. Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1557
(2002) (stating that "if courts would begin to protect even those values we all hold in
common, unapologetically and thoughtfully, they would take a large step forward in the
continuing evolution of ordered liberty").
94. But see David E. Bernstein, Defending the First Amendment From
Antidiscrimination, 82 N.C. L. REv. 223, 228 (2003) (describing antidiscrimination
legislation as a threat to civil liberties).
95. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1 at 785 (2d. ed. 1988)
(characterizing the First Amendment as "the Constitution's most majestic guarantee").
96. See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1785) reprintedin 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 82 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987) ("The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction
and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate."); see also Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593
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conduct infringes upon others' rights that government may curtail that
conduct. 97
In 1963, the Court's Sherbert decision defined the test for free
exercise claims as whether a law is justified by a "compelling state
interest" and, to demonstrate this, the government's showing must amount
interest.', 98
to more than a "rational relationship to some colorable state
The Court further explicated this "compelling interest" test in Yoder 9 and,
seemingly, relied on it for nearly two more decades of decisions.' °°
The landmark case of Smith abandoned the "compelling interest" test
and set forth a rational basis review for neutral laws of general application
that incidentally burden free exercise.' 01 The Smith case arose from the
attempt of two Native American employees to obtain unemployment
benefits. The employees were denied benefits because they were fired "for
cause" by their employer, a drug-rehabilitation facility, for violating a state
controlled substances law when they ingested peyote while participating in
religious rites. Justice Scalia's majority opinion found no exemption was
necessary on free exercise grounds for this neutral law of general
applicability. 10 2 The compelling interest test of Sherbert was not overruled,
but limited to its facts.'0 3 Yoder and its progeny were distinguished from
Smith by noting these decisions involved not free exercise 4alone, but in
conjunction with some other constitutionally protected right.'
(1982) (noting the importance of the First Amendment as a tool for "individual selfrealization.").
97. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. Chi. L. REv. 1109, 1128 (1990) (arguing we should be "free to practice our religions so
long as we do not injure others.").
98. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
99. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding an exemption for Amish students
from attending school through the age of sixteen did not undermine state's interest in
education).
100. Jack S. Vaitayanonta, Note, In State Legislatures We Trust?: The "Compelling
Interest" Presumption and Religious Free Exercise Challenges to State Civil Rights Laws,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 886, 892 (2001) ("Between 1963 and 1990, the Court reaffirmed the
principle that a neutral and generally applicable governmental regulation may nevertheless
be unconstitutional if, in its application, it unduly and incidentally burdens the free exercise
of religion by an individual or a group.").
101. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
102. Id. ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."') (citing U.S.
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
103. Id. at 883 ("We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the
Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we have
sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always
found the test unsatisfied.").
104. Id. at 881. The Court stated:
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In effect, Smith returned the Court's free-exercise analysis to its preSherbert jurisprudence. °5 An important heightened scrutiny exception to
this erasing of the Sherbert era was preserved for hybrid rights: those
involving free exercise and another First Amendment right - including free
speech, 10 6 parental rights 10 7 and freedom of association.0 8
The importance of these hybrid rights was reaffirmed in City of
Boerne'09 in which the Court struck down Congress's legislative attempt to
return to the Sherbert standard by passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act."0 Although at least one circuit court has pronounced the
scheme of affording heightened scrutiny to free exercise claims only when
the claim is conjoined with some other constitutional right as "illogical,"'

The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech
and of the press...
Id. (citations omitted).
105. Critics of the Smith decision included renowned scholars. See Douglas Laycock,
New Directions in Religious Liberty: The Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 1993 BYU L.
REV. 221, 221 ("In a nation that sometimes claims to have been founded for religious
liberty, Smith means that Americans will suffer for conscience"); Ira C. Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation
of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 609 (1991) ("Smith is... profoundly wrong on both
substantive and institutional grounds .... "); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1455
(1990) (arguing the Founders understood protection of religious liberty required specific
measures); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) (considering Smith in view of the First Amendment).
106. Smith, 494 U.S. at 871.
107. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("IT]he interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.").
108. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
109. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
110. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000); see Ira C.
Lupu, Why Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right-Reflections on City of Boerne
v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 808 (1998) (remarking that City of Bourne was
about federal power rather than religious liberty). But see Michael W. McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV.
153, 183 (1997) ("[T]he Court's conclusion that judicial interpretations of the provisions of
the Amendment are the exclusive touchstone for Congressional Enforcement power finds no
support in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment"); cf. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law
Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1465 (1999) (outlining an alternate
approach to federal legislation with states fashioning exemptions in a common-law
approach).
111. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993)
(stating that it is illogical to find that "a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise
Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the Free Exercise
Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional rights").
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there may, indeed, be some logic to the scheme.
The Court emphasized the religious tolerance aspect of free exercise
in its post-Smith decision of City of Hialeah.'12 By emphasizing religious
tolerance," 3 the Court has permitted a broad definition of religion but has
granted such religious exercise little deference in light of government
intrusion. That logic balances the relaxed, rational-basis review in defining
"religion" with the stricter review for hybrid rights, protecting more
traditional aspects of religion in the form of freedom of speech, association,
and determining the religious upbringing of children with the stricter
review hybrid rights provide." 4
B. Free Exercise Challenges to AntidiscriminationLegislation
Prior to Smith, Bob Jones was among several cases in which the
heightened scrutiny of the compelling interest test was used to challenge
antidiscrimination legislation." 5 As noted earlier, the courts gave great
deference to the interest in civil rights and eradicating discrimination
during the Sherbert era. In particular, Title VII and state antidiscrimination
legislation furthered a government aim for equal employment
opportunity.' 6 Therefore, although heightened scrutiny was utilized, free
the compelling
exercise challenges generally could not overcome
7
government interest in equality in employment."
112. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) ("[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible .... ").
113. Id. at 547 ("The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious
tolerance .... ).
114. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881
(1990) (holding that the only cases where the court has held the First Amendment to bar
application of a neutral, generally applicable law has been where the Free Exercise Clause is
acting in conjunction with other amendments).
115. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603--04 (1983); Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 961 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that state civil rights commission's assertion of jurisdiction over a case involving a
teacher who was discharged by a private school after she became pregnant violated the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses), rev'd on jurisdictionalgrounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986);
EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (reviewing a case in
which a religious publishing house dismissed employees in retaliation for bringing
discrimination charges and claimed that it did so based on a religious doctrine that
prohibited church members from bringing lawsuits against the church); Voluntary Ass'n of
Religious Leaders, Churches, & Orgs. v. Waihee, 800 F. Supp. 882, 883 (D. Haw. 1992)
(dismissing challenge to state statute prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in
employment); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1161, 1166 (Mass. 1985) (finding that a
state law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment unnecessarily
burdened a church-published newspaper's free exercise right).
116. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
117. State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 846-47 n.4
(Minn. 1985) (stating that health club owners who insisted on only hiring employees whose
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Not surprisingly, the end of heightened scrutiny and return to a
rational basis review of a free exercise claim under Smith along with the
continued government emphasis on civil rights, particularly in employment
opportunities, left little ground for religious freedom claims.1 8 Any of the
protected categories that equal employment legislation was designed to
protect could prove to be rationally related to the government interest of
equal employment opportunity.'19
Despite Smith's weakening of the free exercise right, the religious
employer exemption to Title VII remained as a protective barrier between
religious employers and discrimination claims. 20 In contrast, following
Smith the parameters of the constitutionally-required ministerial exception
to Title VII received renewed attention.

First formulated during the

Sherbert era in McClure v. Salvation Army, 121 the exception permitted
courts to avoid entanglements prohibited by free exercise and establishment
clauses by giving churches carte blanche in conducting their employment
The McClure court determined
relationship with their ministers.122
Congress did not intend include the church/minister relationship under Title

VII.123 The decision, while claiming to be limited to the facts of the case,
raises doctrinal issues of "church"' 24 and its "ministers"'21 that continue to
religious beliefs were consistent with their religious beliefs were required to comply with
the state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, and marital status).
118. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1536 (M.D. Fla.
1991) ("freedom of association and free exercise of religion have bowed to narrowly
tailored remedies designed to advance the compelling governmental interest in eradicating
employment discrimination").
119. Vaitayanonta, supra note 100, at 901 ("Presumably, any one of the various types of
civil rights laws designed to protect individuals on the basis of classifications such as race,
gender, sexual orientation, age, or marital status could pass this low level of scrutiny simply
owing to the legislature's judgment that such discrimination was undesirable.").
120. See supra Part I.B.
121. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
122. See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304
(1 th Cir. 2000) ("[Alpplying Title VII to the employment relationship between a church
and its clergy would involve excessive government entanglement with religion as prohibited
by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment") (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding that an inquiry into why a member of the clergy was dismissed is
barred by the Fourteenth Amendment).
123. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560-61 ("We therefore hold that Congress did not intend,
through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII to regulate the
employment relationship between church and minister.").
124. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283
(5th Cir. 1981) ("The local congregation that regularly meets in a house of worship is not
the only entity covered by our use of the word 'church."').
125. As an initial matter, the use of the term "minister" might seem to suggest it is only
applicable to certain Protestant denominations and the other relatively few religious sects
that use the term "minister" to describe their clergy. That, however, is certainly not the
case. See Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63
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vex the ministerial exception.
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the ministerial exception,
its Smith holding may fundamentally undermine the exception using
rational basis review, but offer the exception a new basis of renewed
support under the hybrid right analysis. In EEOC v. Catholic University of
America, the court determined the ministerial exception survived Smith
because it represented a "hybrid" of Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause concerns. 2 6 Certainly, any such decisions of minister employment
will involve both constitutional protections, but the hybrid rights to which
Justice Scalia referred in Smith required more than bringing together any
two constitutional claims. 2 7 Rather, the hybrid rights arose when free
exercise is entwined with another distinct fundamental right. 128
Hybrid rights of religious employers are raised in their employment
decisions. 129 However, the strength of such a claim remained relatively
weak vis-a-vis the deference to legislative judgment that ending invidious
discrimination in private employment on the basis of narrowly tailored
protected classes was necessary. 30 Hybrid rights have not played a major
role in free exercise challenges since Smith.' 3 1 However, because Locke v.
Davey 132 has limited the holding in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah 33 as applying to laws showing animus to a particular religion,"
F. Supp. 2d 694, 704 n.7 (E.D.N.C. 1999) ("The court does not intend, by its adoption of the
terminology "church-minister" exception, to suggest that this line of cases applies only to
Protestant institutions and their clergy. The same principles are equally applicable to other
religious entities and their clergy, including rabbis, priests, and imams").
126. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
127. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter,
J. concurring in part) ("If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right
is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith
rule ....
); see also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[A] plaintiff
does not allege a hybrid-rights claim entitled to strict scrutiny analysis merely by combining
a free exercise claim with an utterly meritless claim of the violation of another alleged
fundamental right"); Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 89 n.15 (Cal. 2004)
(rejecting a hybrid claim of free exercise and establishment clause).
128. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
129. Employment has associational aspects similar to membership in an organization.
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Till, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (adopting a
broad reading post-Dale concerning whether the BSA has the right to exclude homosexuals
from all membership or employment positions).
130. See Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 89 (expressing doubt about the validity of the
hybrid-rights theory and noting the Supreme Court has not invoked it since formulating it in
Smith).
131. Id. at 88 ("We are aware of no decision in which a federal court has relied solely on
the hybrid rights theory to justify applying strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim.") But see
Esser, supra note 3, at 242 (positing it is the strength of the attached right that determines
the court's decision).
132. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
133. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 520.
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the focus undoubtedly now will be on hybrids in free exercise claims.
The Court has parsed the hybrid rights associated with child rearing
and free speech in Yoder and Sherbert through its Smith decision.'35 In
part, that explains the relative absence of hybrid claims in the lower courts.
In contrast, there has been no case explicitly addressing freedom of
association and free exercise; therefore, the hybrid of those two
constitutional rights has not yet received examination by any court. This is
particularly significant in a post-Dale era. 136 As the emphasis on civil
rights and antidiscrimination legislation has given way to associational
freedoms in Dale, the hybrid
right of religious and association freedoms
37
now has superior strength.1

III. THE STRENGTH OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION

A. AssociationalFreedoms Defined
Freedom of association constitutes two analytically distinct forms of
association.
Freedom of intimate association is protected by the
substantive due process guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment.'38 This
freedom protects "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships" free from government intrusion.'3 9 Freedom of
expressive association 40is protected under the Freedom of Speech Clause of
the First Amendment.

Although the First Amendment is praised as the centerpiece of the
Constitution, the praise for expressive association protection is not as
universal.14 '
In the first decision explicitly recognizing expressive
association rights, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Alabama required
the NAACP to produce a list of members. 142 The NAACP refused to
comply knowing its ability to organize in a hostile southern state would be
134. Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 ("In Lukumi, the city of Hialeah made it a crime to engage in
certain kinds of animal slaughter. We found that the law sought to suppress ritualistic
animal sacrifices of the Santeria religion. In the present case, the State's disfavor of religion
(if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind.").
135. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
136. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
137. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (suggesting free exercise claims might survive if linked
with freedom of association claims).
138. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
139. Id. at617.
140. Id. at 618.
141. Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-DiscriminationLaw After Dale: A
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1515, 1516 & n.5 (2001) ("Of the liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment, the freedom of association may be the most
distrusted." Carpenter notes "'free exercise' of religion is a close second.").
142. 357 U.S. 449, 453 (1958).
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compromised by such a disclosure. The Court found Alabama's action
would curtail the formulation of ideas embraced by free speech guarantees,
noting "[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
[liberty] ....
,,143
Freedom of association became permanently intertwined with
religious freedoms in Roberts. Justice Brennan noted that associational
rights include the need to gather and form alliances to engage in other44
protected First Amendment activity - including the exercise of religion.'
In Roberts, the Jaycees were unsuccessful in excluding women from
membership in the organization in violation of a state public
accommodations law. Although the organization engaged in expressive
association it was unable to show admitting
women would inhibit the
45
activities engaged in or opinions expressed.
In contrast, the activities and opinion of the organizers of a St.
Patrick's Day parade were inhibited if a group of homosexual people,
14 6
vocally expressing pride in their sexuality, participated in the parade.
This message of sexual pride was wholly different from the message that
the organizers supported and the parade organizers were permitted to
exclude it discriminatorily in order to shape their message. 47 Thus, in
Hurley the expressive association rights
of the parade organizers trumped
148
the state public accommodations law.
B. Dale Strengthens Expressive Association
Dale is most notable for its seeming disinterest in tailoring the holding
to the unique situation presented in the case. 49 It is a broad statement of an
organization's associational freedoms to defeat antidiscrimination
legislation and it strengthens expressive association among fundamental
rights.
The Court upheld the Boy Scouts of America's (BSA) right to exclude
from its membership an openly homosexual man on the basis of his sexual
orientation. 5 °
A state public accommodation law prevented such
exclusion. However, the Court found public accommodation ubiquity
143. Id. at 460.
144. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
145. Id. at 627.
146. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
147. Id. at 576 ("[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is forced upon a
speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker's right to
autonomy over the message is compromised.").
148. Id.
149. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); see Troum, supra note 88, at 680.
150. Id. at 642.
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violated First Amendment rights and set to reconfigure the model to push
associational freedoms back into the spotlight antidiscrimination legislation
previously enjoyed. 5 '
In formulating associational rights, the Court granted the organization
control over its message, even absent specific evidence that this message
had importance within the organization or was maintained strictly. 52 Thus,
BSA claimed its objection to homosexuality was evidenced by goals to be
"morally straight" and "clean." '53 Further, the Court granted to the
organization the right to exclude individuals based on the organization's
analysis of whom or what type of expression would impair their
message.'54 Such deference to exclusion of members of a protected class
based on expressive association directly conflicted with Court precedent
elevating antidiscrimination goals over an association's exclusionary
tendencies.'5 5 Previously, in Norwood v. Harrison, the Court held that
freedom of expression resulting in private discrimination was not afforded
constitutional protection. 156 Now, the BSA is allowed such deference.
In Roberts, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion attempted to tailor
the majority opinion to avoid those organizations who wanted to
discriminate through an associational freedom claim. To do so she noted a
distinction between commercial associations and expressive associations,
the latter enjoying full constitutional protection. 1 7 Justice O'Connor
required an association to "choose its market."' 58 If the choice is one that is
commercial "in any substantial degree" the association may not choose its
members and
is correspondingly limited in the message it can
59
disseminate.
Dale does not embrace the limitations developed in Justice
O'Connor's Roberts concurrence. Rather, the majority opinion seems to
151. Id. at 657 ("As the definition of 'public accommodation' has expanded... the
potential for conflict between state public accommodations laws and the First Amendment
rights of organizations has increased.").
152. Carpenter, supra note 141, at 1538.
153. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
154. Id. at 653 ("As we give deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature
of its expression, we must also give deference to an association's view of what would impair
its expression."); see also Carpenter, supranote 141, at 1540 (calling impairment analysis in
Dale a "sheep in wolf s clothing.").
155. See Stephen P. Hayford, Case Note, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446
(2000), 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 825, 854 (2001) ("While this holding is a victory for
organizations' freedom of expressive association, it provides very little protection for
individuals in minority groups seeking access to public accommodations, and represents a
defeat for states that seek to end discrimination.").
156. 413 U.S. 455,469 (1973).
157. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
158. Id. at 636.
159. Id.
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embrace the notion that associational freedoms necessarily result in
diminished equality. Nonetheless, the message as formulated by the
organization is protected. 16°
The dissent in Dale recognizes the impact of the majority opinion on
civil rights jurisprudence. In particular, the grant of power to organizations
in formulating and executing a message in the most exclusionary manner it
deems necessary without requiring a balance is a significant departure for
the Court.1 6' The dissent would require a showing of a62 "clear and
unequivocal" message to offset antidiscrimination protections.
C. Expressive Association as a Hybrid
Commentators and courts debate the importance of Dale to
antidiscrimination law. In particular, some commentators believe equal
employment opportunity legislation is sacrosanct. 163 They claim that, while
antidiscrimination legislation likely will not proliferate in public
accommodation legislation post-Dale, the overall impact of the decision is
minor and justified in terms of the organization or the protected class at
issue. '6
Such analysis fails to recognize two related issues. Firstly, to rely on
Court precedent to narrow the implication of Dale disregards the change in
jurisprudential priorities from civil rights and equality protection to the
reinforcement of fundamental rights. 165 Certainly the scales may have been
balanced toward usurping individual rights in favor of equality in the past
but, regardless where one finds the balance is achieved, antidiscrimination
legislation and court precedent must be viewed in light of this shift in
priorities.
Secondly, Title VII and state employment antidiscrimination

160. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
161. Id. at 676 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Carpenter, supra note 141, at 1517-18 (arguing Dale will not have revolutionary
consequences in areas where equality guarantees are "most critically needed" - particularly
employment).
164. Id. at 1517. Some are more fearful of Dale's consequences. See, e.g., Nan D.
Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REv.
1591, 1591 (2001) ("[Dale] may portend a substantial rewriting of previous expressive
association law .... At a minimum, it weakens the claim to open participation in our civic
culture by lesbians and gay men."). Dale is also criticized for both contradicting and
ignoring altogether the Court's holding in Runyon v. McCray. Id. at 1603.
165. See Laura B. Mutterperl, Note, Employment at (God's) Will: The Constitutionality
of Antidiscrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 389, 416 (2002) ("Because some religious organizations may feel that hiring
exclusively coreligionists is necessary to maintain their religious identity, the right of
association suggests at least a limited entitlement to discriminate.").
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legislation is not universally affected by the broad pronouncements in Dale,
but a subset of employment antidiscrimination legislation is necessarily
impacted - the religious employer. The religious employer invokes not just
a free exercise
the strengthened associational freedoms but also advances
166
claim, thus producing a hybrid right pursuant to Smith.
Although Smith grants hybrids heightened scrutiny, one noted
commentator has found that that it is the strength of the fundamental right
intertwined with free exercise that determines the court decision. 67
Accepting this conclusion, free exercise combines with a powerful
expressive associational claim to create a claim that a religious employer
can employ co-religionists as an exercise of expressive association despite
antidiscrimination legislation in employment.
IV. STRIKING A BALANCE FOR RELIGIOUS BUSINESS OWNERS

A.

A Clash of Rights

The Court's focus on associational freedoms in Dale and its
accommodations of various "sincerely held" beliefs as free exercise
establishes the potential rights of business owners to require employees to
be co-religionists and to discriminate against those applicants that profess
As rights asserted in the First
non-adherent religious beliefs. 16
Amendment to the Constitution each alone, and all the more so as a hybrid,
are touted as preeminent. Other rights are implicated in the employment of
co-religionists, however.
Throughout this Article the importance of civil rights legislation
largely is characterized as equality legislation with a normative force
defining a commitment to justice. The Court consistently recognized
sufficient government interest in establishing equality in employment as
well as public accommodation as a means of advancing a societal value of
to the individual and maintaining a
justice both in terms of fairness
16 9
meritocratic community norm.

In addition to this equal justice paradigm, 7 ° however, is the essential
166. But see Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 74 n.3
(Cal. 2004) (suggesting skepticism of hybrid right in a case concerning employment
benefits).
167. Esser, supra note 3, at 242.
168. Business owners may bring religion in the workplace in a manner that does not
evoke the same constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Timothy L. Fort, Religion in the
Workplace: Mediating Religion's Good, Bad and Ugly Naturally, 12 NoTRE DAME J.L.
ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 121, 126 (1998) (maintaining religious beliefs have a legitimate role
in business ethics).
169. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984).
170. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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constitutional right of equal protection underlying the formation of Title
VII and other antidiscrimination legislation. The Fourteenth Amendment
offers secure grounding for the ban on private discrimination motivated by
race or sex. 1 7 1 But this grounding is far from absolute and courts
consistently weigh even equal protection against competing rights.
Therefore, the extent of this ban is necessarily limited to these enumerated
categories, 172 while other legislatively protected categories, such as national
origin, are less constitutionally secure but rather rest wholly on the
commitment to equal justice.
Ultimately, there exists no inalienable right to employment. Free
exercise and freedom of association claims of an employer who chooses to
offer employment opportunities to individuals whose religious practice
make them otherwise largely unemployable or to a home health care
provider who seeks to carry a religious message as well as a service to its
clients may rest their claims on constitutional principles which Dale raises73
to a higher constitutional priority than Title VII employment directives.'
Title VII itself limits its protections to those employers with fifteen or more
employees. 174 Even under state antidiscrimination legislation, the smallest
employers are free to discriminate. No constitutional right is absolute and
the clash of the rights between employees and employers is emblematic
of
175
debated.
critically
being
point
balancing
the
an inherent compromise,
The issues here involve two different legal relationships involving religion:
Title VII endeavors to free individuals from a religiously-hostile work
environment and from hiring exclusions based on religion while
individuals, including private employers, are free from government
interference in the free exercise of religion in operating their business. 76 A
useful analogy explored by the courts is the regulation of speech in the
context of workplace harassment. 77 Courts addressing this matter

171. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
172. Even defining the appropriate groups in terms of race and sex may challenge the
courts. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) (rejecting sex
discrimination claim for an otherwise comprehensive short-term disability policy that
excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage under an employer's benefit plan by
explaining the exclusion was not based on sex but between those people who are pregnant
and those who are not, the latter category including both men and women) superceded by
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k).
173. See infra Part I.B. concerning the religious employer exemption in light of First
Amendment concerns.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
175. We use the term "balance" not in the sense of finding equilibrium between these
competing and contradictory rights but in the sense of constitutional co-existence, much like
the "time, place and manner" restrictions limiting the absolute right of free speech. See
Gedicks, supra note 70 (discussing free speech parallels to the Establishment Clause).
176. EEOC v. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 763, 805 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
177. DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n., 51 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1995)
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rationalize finding discriminatory speech as a "time, place, and manner
178
regulation of speech" permitted under free speech jurisprudence.
Although the time, place, manner limitations may control harassing speech
in the workplace somewhat tidily, the same formula is unworkable for free
expression 7 9 because Title VII itself specifically permits religion in the
workplace through its religious accommodation requirements. 80 Thus, if
free exercise requires employers to permit religious considerations, can
Title VII disallow private employers from free exercise and expressive
association in its hiring? We think not given the renewed strength of this
hybrid right.
B. Maintain Exemption under Title VII
The system of exemptions employed to carve out constitutional
parameters often are placed squarely in the center of the debate about
appropriate equilibrium. The literature concerning exemptions is plentiful
and distinguished.' 8' With respect to employer exemptions, much of the
However, constitutional
literature eschews such compromises. 182
jurisprudence has developed a strengthened freedom of association both
alone and as a hybrid with free exercise. 8' The unique impact of this
development on employment discrimination legislation requires
consideration. Therefore, in the narrow context of the religious and
association freedoms of business owners to employ co-religionists and the
equal employment opportunity agenda encapsulated in Title VII, we
advocate for invigorating the religious employer exemption under Title VII
as defining regulation of competing priorities.
Having chosen an existing Title VII exception by which to
accommodate and contain the religious associational rights of employers in
relation to antidiscrimination legislation, one may wonder why we opted
for the religious employer exemption rather than the exception that seems
("Where pure expression is involved, Title VII steers into the territory of the First
Amendment. It is no use to deny or minimize this problem....").
178. Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
179. See Gedicks, supra note 70 (Using the two-track theory of free speech
jurisprudence to formulate a two-track theory for the Establishment Clause).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
181. See Ira C. Lupu, The CaseAgainst Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (1999); Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious
Exemptions - A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595 (1999).
182. See Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
HistoricalPerspective, 60 GEO WASH L. REV 915, 948 (1992) ("[A] constitutional right of

religious exemption was not even an issue in serious contention among the vast majority of
Americans.").
183. See supra Part III.C.
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more applicable at first blush, the bona fide occupational qualification
exception (BFOQ). s4 The answer is quite simple: it does not fit the scope
of the constitutional issues implicated in this Article. This is evident by
examining how the BFOQ would fail to address the example employers we
have previously presented as likely beneficiaries of the newly-invigorated
religious association hybrid.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that this BFOQ exception is
applicable in only the most narrow circumstances."' The oft-quoted
requirement for a BFOQ is that an employer must prove the "essence of the
business operation would be undermined" if someone with non-conforming
religious beliefs were hired for the position. 18 6 For the home health care
business typified in PreferredManagement, the employer could claim the
essence of its business operations is to share its religious beliefs with its
clients. However, the courts have not interpreted "essence of business
operation" in terms of business goals but, rather, in terms of
functionality." 7
It is not necessary functionally for a home health care provider to have
a religious background to care for clients' physical needs. Also, an
employee may be willing to advance a religious message with clients
whether or not the employee's religious beliefs conform to the message.
However, this is not the free exercise of religion the employers seek.
Rather, the business owners' religious beliefs may require that the message
is lived by its employees and non-adherents could not proselytize to the
clients of the business with any genuine conviction. A BFOQ exception
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). This section provides:
(e) [I]t shall not be an unlawful practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees .... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business enterprise.
Id.
185. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (applying the narrow BFOQ
exception to the general prohibition against discrimination based on sex).
186. Id. at 333 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
1971)).
187. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388 (calling BFOQ a "business necessity test, not a business
convenience test"); see also Rasul v. District of Columbia, 680 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1988)
(holding that denominational hiring of prison chaplains does not meet BFOQ test); Abrams
v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (finding policy excluding Jews
from Saudi Arabian hospital teams does not satisfy BFOQ); Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577
F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that requirement of Muslim pilots to fly into
Mecca, Saudi Arabia on threat of beheading under local law is a BFOQ because business
cannot operate if its pilots are beheaded); cf. Pime v. Loyola Univ., 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.
1986) (stating that BFOQ exception applies to Jesuit-affiliated university seeking to
maintain a Jesuit influence in its philosophy department).
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similarly would not address the free exercise claim of an employer who
discriminates in hiring in order to promote the daily time demands of
religious adherents who otherwise could not work regular hours and fully
practice their religion.
To consider fully the free exercise and expressive association claim of
private employers, courts must address the factors that produce the hybrid
right. Free exercise alone would not impact the civil rights goals of Title
VII.

88

Only when free exercise has the additional element of freedom of

association, now more fully endorsed by the Court following Dale, is there
an inescapable impact on antidiscrimination legislation. 8

9

Although

private employers should assert their hybrid rights recently developed by
the Court, the underlying considerations offer delimiting factors that
promote the constitutional co-existence of rights.
Justice O'Connor's well-reasoned concurrence in Roberts,'9" wields
less persuasive authority after Dale failed to recognize its commercial
associations and expressive associations dichotomy. This is not the balance
we strike. An association's profit motive is just one of several factors to
consider in making the essential determination of whether a business owner
may express religious beliefs in hiring practices. In the employment
antidiscrimination context, Dale's deference to the organization's message,
both in terms of formulation and dissemination, '' also fails to enforce
these important constitutional requirements. Rather, an organization with
the central mission of promoting and advocating a religious belief must
show objectively that its mission would be undermined by employing
individuals who do not share this belief system.
Title VII suggests one way an employer who wishes to advocate
hire
could
practices
business
through
orientation
theological
discriminatorily without raising antidiscrimination concerns: limit the
number of employees the business owner can hire. Although many state
and local laws that likewise prohibit discrimination in the employment
context reach much smaller numbers of employees, a cap on employees has
the appeal to resolve this issue. Indeed, in all likelihood the employers who
focus primarily on religious advocacy over profit motive of a business will
be small businesses. This is an obvious compromise position.
Permitting a "small business" exemption for the purpose of free
exercise and freedom of association, even if the number of employees
permitted under the exemption is large enough to accommodate every

188. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990)
(holding that generally the First Amendment does not bar "application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action").
189. See supra note 129.
190. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring).
191. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
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business owner who would want to take advantage of it, creates dangerous
precedent and ultimately does not respect the constitutional provisions as
fundamental rights. It would be under-inclusive.192 Yet, a size limitation
also would be grossly over-inclusive, as hardly every sufficiently small
employer would use religious associational considerations as hiring criteria.
In the end, the simplicity of a "small business" exemption would be
overshadowed by its arbitrariness.
Each of these competing interests of civil rights and religious exercise
play vital roles in our society so that we would avoid a compromise
position and advocate, instead, for a position that recognizes the essential
nature and goals of each and promotes each in a way that leads to coexistence rather than compromise.
The religious employer exemption Congress incorporated in Title
VII1 93 can achieve the appropriate constitutional nexus. Its parameters
facilitate religious and association freedoms of business owners derived
from the First Amendment while requiring equality in employment. The
factors considered in granting such an exemption should be: whether the
main pursuit of the employer is to express a devotion that is considered
religious under current free exercise jurisprudence; whether, objectively,
the formulation and dissemination of the religious message is undermined
by the presence of non-conforming employees; whether the devotion
represents a complete and exclusive belief system; and whether profit
motivation in the end outweighs religious mission.
C. Factorsfor a PrivateEmployer Religious Exemption Analyzed
1. Religious Exercise as a Primary Pursuit
The central aim in granting a religious employer exemption is to
permit those employers who promote a religious message to engage in this
constitutional right free of government interference in hiring. However, the
main goal of the business owner must be that of religious exercise, rather
than merely pursuing a niche market for profit. The focus here is not on
alternatives to religious expression but on whether the exercise of religious
If private
ideals necessarily implicates associational freedoms.' 94
192. Despite the above generalization, religiously-motivated employers would not, by
necessity, employ only a small number of workers. Consider, for instance, our example of
the business owner whose purpose is to establish a place of employment that is tailor made
for accommodating particularly onerous or non-traditional religious practices or worship. In
a community with a large population of individuals who adhere to that religion, the
employer could grow quite large.
193. See supra Part I.B.
194. For example, in Preferred Management, converting employees was part of the
business owners' religious and business purposes. EEOC v. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 216 F.
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employers need not employ co-religionists as part of their religious beliefs
and practices, the hybrid right is not created and the lower level of scrutiny
of Smith represents the extent of the constitutional protections.
The recent Catholic Charities decision by the California Supreme
Court offers an example of a religious employer exemption under
California's Women's Contraceptive Equity Act (WCEA) that reaches
many of the same employers advocated in our four factor analysis.'95
WCEA's exemption requires religious employers to have the inculcation of
religious values as the purpose of the entity and the employer must
196
primarily employ and serve persons who share the same religious tenets.
Catholic Charities did not qualify under this exemption because its primary
purpose was to offer social services rather than the "inculcation of religious
values," and many of its employees were not Catholic. 9 7 Likewise,
Catholic Charities as an employer would not qualify under our proposed
exemption because it is not organized to advocate for religious tenets and
must not employ co-religionists to do so.
The difficulties associated with measuring the sincerity of any
religious belief are present in determining whether private employers have
a purpose of religious exercise. 98 Just as the definition of religion is
painted in broad strokes by government entities in order to avoid
Establishment Clause entanglements, so must the activities of religious
groups be considered broadly. Exercise of religion through enterprise,
however, may be required by religious organizations, as the religious
employer exemption of WCEA suggests.199
2. Objective Evidence Must Exist Showing That Employees Promote
Religious Belief
In addition, to consider the competing aims of civil liberties and civil
rights, the religious tenet requiring co-religionist hiring must be one
objectively documented. The employer's devotion and analysis of whom
or what type of association would impair the message similarly must be
determined objectively. This documentation requirement is addressed in
Dale, but the majority does not require overtly objective indicators of
Supp. 2d 763, 819 (S.D. Ind. 2002). Therefore, the owners were willing to associate with
non-adherents as part of their religious expression.
195. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 74 n.3 (Cal.

2004).
196. Id.at 74, n. 3.
197. Id. at 75.
198. See id. at 79 ("Congress and the state legislatures have drawn such distinctions for
this purpose, and laws embodying such distinctions have passed constitutional muster.")
(citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1978)).
199. Id. at 75.
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purpose and mission. °0
Certainly, Establishment Clause concerns are raised by requiring proof
of religious exercise through private business. 20 ' However, a variety of
laws require the government to distinguish between religious and secular
activities, and it is upon objective indicators that this distinction must be
made.20 2
For a private employer pursuing religious exercise through a business
purpose and as a criterion for discriminatory hiring, the objective evidence
must be obvious and available to entities and individuals who may evaluate
this information before choosing to engage in business transactions. 2 3 The
opportunities to document the religious exercise purpose of a business are
numerous, ranging from business formation documents to employee
handbooks. Interactions with clients or customers would provide further
objective evidence to support an exemption under Title VII.
3. Religious Devotion Represents a Complete and Exclusive Belief
System
An additional factor in qualifying for an exemption under Title VII is
whether the message that the employer seeks to promote represents a
complete and exclusive belief system. 204 For example, the Boy Scouts of
America, as an employer, would not be exempted from antidiscrimination
legislation under this formulation because, although the organization
undoubtedly has a religious message in its promotion of spirituality and a
higher power, it promotes that message in conjunction with various
religious organizations that share this main tenet. As the religious message
is one promoting religion generally rather than a complete belief system to
the exclusion of embracing others, it does not rise to a constitutionally
205
protected message over the civil rights goals in employment.
200. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000) (demonstrating that through
the Scout Oath, BSA showed evidence of goals for its members to be "morally straight" and
"clean").
201. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (criticizing laws that invite
government officials "trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs").
202. See supra note 28.
203. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting an association entering the "marketplace of
commerce" loses some control over its affairs it otherwise would retain if it remained in the
"marketplace of ideas").
204. Such a belief system need not be consistent with an established religion. See supra
Part I.A.
205. Cf EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding that school does not qualify for curriculum-based religious educational institution
exemption from Title VII, when "religion [was] more a part of the general tradition of the
Schools than a part of their mission, and serv[ed] primarily as a means for advancing moral
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If an entity embraces religion generally or a broad category of
religions, the expressive association concerns that elevate free exercise are
far more tenuous. Dale supported an organization's ability to tailor its
message and granted broad freedom of association. 206 However, this
latitude did not eliminate the Court's requirement in Roberts for a "proof of
membership-message" connection. 2 7 The connection between a private
employer's religious advocacy and those employees who can promote that
message are particularly strong when the message is more narrowly
tailored.2 °s
Hiring focused on advocating a broad category of religion does not
represent free exercise and associational rights so much as exclusion of
individuals of nonconforming beliefs or practices. 2° It is this exclusion of
the potential employee's religious beliefs that Title VII is focused on
eliminating. Religious beliefs must be appropriately tailored so as not to
violate the essential nature of civil rights goals.
4. Profit Motive Examined
Private employers with the goal of religious advocacy-including
employing only individuals who share their religious tenets-should not be
banned from that pursuit based solely on a profit element. Commercial
enterprises are granted less protection under the First Amendment in many
respects. 2 0 However, the definition of religion for constitutional purposes
is sufficiently broad to accommodate an infinite number of belief systems,
some of which may be exercised through for-profit transactions. 211' Profit
element must be considered in making this determination but it is not, by
necessity, mutually exclusive with the other factors such that it should
presumptively disqualify the employer from exemption.

values in the context of a general education").
206. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (granting deference to an
organization "regarding the nature of its expression").
207. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627, 632.
208. See id. at 627-28 ("In claiming that women might have a different attitude about
such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations... the
Jaycees relies solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and
perspectives of men and women.").
209. See Alvin C. Lin, Note, Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Laws and the
Religious Liberty Protection Act: The Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 89

GEO. L.J. 719, 720 (2001) ("[Allthough the Free Exercise Clause was intended to protect
free exercise of religion, it was not intended to be used as a tool for individuals seeking to
bypass generally applicable antidiscrimination laws.").
210. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634 (noting that states may regulate commercial
transactions and that the "constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees,
customers, [or] suppliers.., without restraint from the state").
211. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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Justice O'Connor's Roberts dissent offers a potential standard to
determine associations subject to rationally related state regulation by
characterizing as commercial those associations with activities "not
'
Justice
predominantly of the type protected by the First Amendment."2 12
O'Connor recognizes that no "simple precision" can characterize
associations as commercial or expressive.2 13 Nonetheless, her formulation
of the standard is an attempt to give protection to purely expressive
association. The difficulty with this commercial/noncommercial standard
is that the formulation of the standard assumes that activities which are
commercial cannot be activities that are predominantly the type protected
by the First Amendment. We believe our examples prove otherwise.
The business owners in Preferred Management undeniably had as
their goal an effort to advocate religious values documented in "The Great
Commission" directive. 1 4 Their business as home health care providers
offered them an opportunity to go into people's homes and share their faith
with them. These owners believed their faith as Born-Again Christians
required them to express these tenets in every aspect of their lives,
including the workplace.2 15 Obviously, adequate home health care service
is an important part of this business, but there seems no clear line that
either religious advocacy or health care were predominantly the activities
of the business. In fact, the business owners could point to "The Great
Commission" and other documents guiding how their business must be
established to comply with their faith as the major activity of the business.
The second example we have referred to throughout this Article is that
of a business owner whose business purpose is establishing an
accommodating employment atmosphere for co-religionists when their
shared religious beliefs require worshipping in a way that is considered an
"undue hardship" for other employers.21 6 The commercial nature of the
business is to allow free exercise of religion while employees earn a
livelihood. Were it not for the religious requirement, there would be no
need for the business.
Therefore, the commercial aspects and for-profit status of private
employers cannot easily be separated to impose a bright line rule.
Arguably, tax-paying entities should not be less qualified for an exemption
under Title VII than religious entities that otherwise are exempted from

212. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635.
213. Id. at 635.
214. EEOC v. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 763, 773 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
215. Id. at 773.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977) (establishing the standard that an employer was not responsible to
accommodate an employee's religious practices if it resulted in more than "de minimis"
cost).
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regulatory or tax burdens. 2t7 Nevertheless, evidence that the motivation for
profit, financial or market growth, or the like appears to drive the
employer's decisions is relevant to this inquiry. In fact, it may very well
belie the objective evidence of the religious mission or purpose required by
the second factor of our proposed exemption analysis. Yet, while business
transactions and other displays of profit motivation may be indicators that
the first three factors of the test are not sufficiently strong, profit motive
cannot solely negate the existence of this super hybrid right.
These factors necessarily mean all but a very small number of
religious business owners cannot discriminate in employment decisions.
For that small number of business owners who wish to advocate a narrow
theological orientation through their commercial pursuits, important
constitutional rights are maintained. The factors represent the essential
elements of a free exercise and associational hybrids, but one which
permits the emerging civil liberties to exist alongside well-established civil
rights.
V. CONCLUSION

When combined with Dale as an emblem of the reemergence of civil
liberties, Smith's hybrid rights could prove problematic for the civil rights
advances made over the past four decades. Therefore, we recognize the
important values represented in this libertarian emphasis but additionally
recognize the need to limit its effect on important civil rights and equality
values.
Thus, we have advocated a position that recognizes and respects the
core of the Dale associational expression as a super-hybrid constitutional
free exercise right, while setting up a factor balancing approach that limits
its use only to those employers who are truly using the employment process
as a means of expressive association and religious exercise. By doing so,
the employer's belief system will be laid bare for the market forces to judge
whether or not such a business can and should survive. If there is a niche
market for such businesses, they will survive and perhaps flourish. If not,
they will not.

217. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (upholding Title VII exemption as "benevolent
neutrality"); Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (permitting property tax
exemption for religious organizations that used the property for religious purposes
exclusively).

